CHAPTER 1

The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy

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Our title, *Defending Europe*, was chosen because its double meaning reflects the central themes of this book. All of the chapters that follow deal with issues related to the profound transformation of policy for the defense of Europe and the assurance of its security, as formulated within both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, all of the chapters address the issue of how new institutional arrangements may be viewed, in part, as devices for defending Europe's interests or enhancing its influence vis-à-vis an increasingly hegemonic United States within the Atlantic Alliance. "Not since Rome has a single power enjoyed such superiority," as Timothy Garton Ash noted recently—"but the Roman colossus only bestrode one part of the world."[1] As figure 1.1 illustrates, the U.S. defense budget is now *five times* that of Russia and is larger than the combined defense budgets of the next nine states on the top ten list.

For allies, the problem with America's dazzling high-tech military power—as manifested from the Gulf War to Kosovo to Afghanistan—is not primarily that it is American, but simply that it is so awesome. Ash's essay implores American readers to understand that it "would be dangerous even for an archangel to wield so much power" and goes on to stress that Americans should understand allied concerns given that the



Figure 1.1 The top ten defense budgets in 2000

U.S. constitution, replete with checks and balances, is predicated on the assumption that "no single locus of power, however benign, should predominate; for even the best could be led into temptation."[2] While American defense spending has always exceeded that of its European allies, the gap has increased substantially since the end of the Cold War (see table 1.1) and is now in the process of being widened further by the Bush administration's $40 billion defense-budget hike for 2002 triggered by the events of September 11. It is striking to note that the planned *increase* in the American defense budget for 2002 is substantially more than the *entire* defense budget of the highest-spending EU member state. Moreover, as a number of chapters in this volume will discuss in detail, the growing spending gap *understates* the U.S.–European capability gap, especially in terms of the latest high-tech weaponry. In this context, even many staunchly pro-American Europeans have become concerned about the transatlantic power imbalance. On the other side of the Atlantic, many American commentators have welcomed what they view as a long-overdue recognition by Europeans that the EU should play a larger role in—and shoulder more of the burden for—maintaining the security of the Continent.

Throughout the last decade both European and American officials, for their own reasons, have thus sought to "rebalance" or strengthen NATO through the development of a stronger "European pillar." Thousands of

Table 1.1 EU and US defense expenditures in 2000

Country	*Defense expenditures ($ billions)*	*% change 1985–2000*	*Per capita expenditures*	*% GDP for defense*
France	34.3	−29	580	2.6
U.K.	33.9	−28	576	2.4
Germany	28.2	−46	343	1.6
Italy	20.6	−19	359	1.9
Spain	7.1	−37	178	1.3
Netherlands	6.3	−28	405	1.9
Greece	5.5	+58	513	4.9
Sweden	5.2	+10	583	2.2
Belgium	3.3	−45	328	1.4
Denmark	2.4	−22	454	1.5
Portugal	2.2	+21	222	2.2
Austria	1.6	−16	196	0.8
Finland	1.5	−32	294	1.3
Ireland	0.7	+44	183	0.7
Luxembourg	0.1	+33	291	0.8
EU-15	152.9	−30	408	2.0
U.S.A.	294.7	−23	1059	3.0

hours have been devoted to drafting and debating alternative means to accomplish this goal: the launch of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the EU, the revival of the Western European Union (WEU), the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, and finally the creation of a potentially more robust European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) for the EU. All of these institutional innovations have reflected, at least to some extent, a quest for greater European autonomy. All of them have been officially supported by American leaders—but with increasing misgivings, especially in regard to the possibility that movement toward autonomy could lead to "decoupling." And all of them have been widely supported in Europe—but with growing concerns about both the means and the ends of the enterprise.

This volume thus seeks to analyze the competing ambitions, the contrasting visions and the transatlantic tensions related to the recent quest by Europe for autonomy in the sphere of security and defense. "Autonomy" is a word that has given rise to much misunderstanding. We define it as meaning the political and military capability on the part of the EU to take decisions and to embark on initiatives involving

the projection of military power with limited or no assistance from the United States. As the chapters in this book will illustrate, a central challenge facing the ESDP project is to give practical meaning to each element of such an abstract definition.

It should be noted at the outset that today's ESDP may be viewed as a project that has been in gestation for some fifty years. From Ernest Bevin's and Georges Bidault's 1947 scheme for *Western Union* in which "Western Europe should be independent both of the United States and of the Soviet Union,"[3] to the *European Defense Community* of the 1950s that aimed to create an autonomous, "supranational defense capacity with common institutions, common armed forces and a common budget,"[4] to the *Fouchet Plan* of the 1960s that sought to create a politically independent Europe with its own defense policy and capacity (but structured intergovernmentally),[5] to *European Political Cooperation* in the 1970s that attempted to achieve "better mutual understanding, harmonisation of views, coordination of positions and a common approach" to foreign policy,[6] to the revival of *Western European Union* in the 1980s, culminating in a declaration by the nine WEU foreign and defense ministers at the Hague in October 1987 that "the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defense,"[7] to the project for a *Common Foreign and Security Policy* (CFSP) since 1991, Europe has had many bites at the "ESDP cherry." Some may argue that the reasons why these previous attempts failed are precisely the reasons why the current attempt will fail. But the earlier experiences all arose from different historical impulses—and they failed for different reasons.[8] One of the tasks undertaken in this volume is to demonstrate why the current ESDP project deserves to be taken seriously despite the failure of many previous initiatives.

This introductory chapter will briefly highlight the most significant developments since the end of the Cold War, frame central issues to be addressed throughout the book, and provide an overview of the ten chapters to follow.

The Prelude

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, traditional principles regarding European security and transatlantic relations seemed to have been rendered irrelevant overnight. The prevailing wisdom among security experts and many actors was that NATO, which had just celebrated its fortieth birthday, would not outlive the demise of the Soviet threat against which it had been forged.[9] Several European leaders, and most

notably French president François Mitterrand, assumed that the European Community (EC: soon to be renamed the EU) would now aspire toward some form of autonomous security capacity—albeit within the context of a radically restructured Atlantic Alliance.[10] In March 1991, European Commission President Jacques Delors made what is often regarded as the classic speech in favor of European security autonomy.[11] In June 1991, Luxembourg's foreign minister, Jacques Poos, chairing the Council of Ministers when Serbia engaged in military hostilities against Slovenia, declared (a shade prematurely) that "the hour of Europe" had arrived. These stirrings of independence—bordering on insubordination—were sufficiently irritating to President George Bush (the elder) that, when he met his European colleagues in Rome in November 1991 to discuss a new strategic concept for the Alliance, he bluntly warned them "if what you want is independence, the time to tell us is now."[12]

The 1991 Gulf War had made it abundantly clear to both Washington and the main European capitals that Europe was far from being in a position to move toward anything approaching security autonomy. The subsequent wars of Yugoslav succession in the Balkans drove the point home. Although there were a variety of schemes in circulation for replacing the dominant "NATO narrative"—including a Soviet bid to reestablish the balance of powers, a German/Czech bid to turn the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) into a major security actor and the French-led bid to prioritize the WEU—all of those alternative narratives failed to materialize. By 1994, NATO had risen, Phoenix-like, from its own apparent self-immolation and had reemerged as the only show in town.[13] And yet it was a show that could not go on in the same old way. On Washington's Capitol Hill, in particular, the decibel levels were rising around inquiries as to why it was that an EU with a GDP equal to or superior to that of the United States and with a considerably larger population could not do more to organize and above all to fund its own security.[14]

The Movement toward Limited Autonomy: WEU, NATO and ESDI

Since the late 1980s, when European political leaders began to think seriously about enhanced coordination of EC/EU security policy, the solution to the conundrum seemed to be optimally sought via the WEU. Hence, the enormous profusion of policy papers, analytical studies and institutional blueprints that dominated the attention of actors and

analysts from 1987 (*Platform of the Hague*) to 1997 (AFSouth crisis and U.K. veto on EU–WEU merger proposals). The potential of WEU to offer the solution to the conundrum seemed self-evident to most experts. WEU had a long (if not glorious) history. It was the only dedicated *European* security and defense institution common to most EC/EU member states. It succeeded, progressively, in associating with its activities most other European states, although this is considered to have exacerbated the awkwardness of its procedures.[15] It had begun to work increasingly effectively with NATO. And it avoided the apparent political minefield of introducing defense and security issues directly into the EU—a proposition to which the U.K. (Europe's most efficient military power), in particular, was unutterably opposed.

The mid-1990s proposals for an ESDI and for the development of CJTFs flowed directly from the WEU logic. The very fact that ESDI was about *identity* (within NATO) rather than about either *policy* or *capacity* indicated its limited ambition. ESDI was unofficially launched at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Brussels in January 1994. It was initially conceived largely as a technical-military arrangement that would allow the Europeans to assume a greater share of the burden for security missions—that is, "strengthen the European Pillar of the Alliance"—by providing the WEU with access to those NATO assets and capabilities that European member states did not possess. But it also had a transformative political dimension in that it posited a willingness on the part of NATO as an institution, and on the part of the United States as the foremost NATO member state, to countenance a greater security role for the EU. Ultimately, as we will discuss later, the *political* message of ESDI—that a clearer, bigger European role was both acceptable and desirable—acquired more importance than the technical-military arrangements designed essentially to provide access to NATO/U.S. assets.[16]

NATO's June 1996 Berlin ministerial meeting may be seen, in retrospect, as the high point of ESDI. In an apparent breakthrough, an agreement was reached involving a U.S. commitment to support a meaningful European military capacity through CJTFs (see later) and a French commitment to move toward full integration of a restructured Atlantic Alliance.[17] ESDI was to entail allowing EU forces to be separated out from the NATO force pool in order to undertake a mission with which the United States or "the Alliance as a whole" did not wish to be involved. ESDI was therefore envisioned as a facilitating mechanism within NATO that hinged around the notion of "separable but not separate" forces. A key feature was the predesignation of

a European command chain allowing the Deputy Supreme Commander (DSACEUR), a European officer, to command a WEU-led operation. The CJTFs, as Terry Terriff demonstrates in chapter 3, were conceived as military structuring arrangements allowing given operations to be manned by appropriate forces drawn from a range of services and a number of different countries. This allowed total flexibility in the designation, from within NATO, of air, naval and land elements from a range of European countries, under the predesignated European command chain. These would be drawn up via WEU/NATO consultation procedures. A key feature was the transfer to an EU-led force of certain U.S. military assets and capabilities.

In theory, the political-military potential of the Berlin agreement was substantial. However, the Berlin formula for ESDI proved to be a double illusion. First, what became known as the "Berlin Plus" process—the post-Berlin discussions intended to put ESDI/CJTFs on solid procedural ground by providing assured access to NATO planning facilities, presumed access to NATO assets and capabilities, and the identification of a distinct European chain of command—failed to make much headway, despite repeated official Alliance assurances to the contrary. Most important, the U.S. military produced objections to allowing the Europeans access to crucial but sensitive American assets. Second, at the first real test of "Europeanization" of the Alliance structures—the French bid for NATO's Southern Command (AFSouth)—the whole house of cards came tumbling down.[18]

Despite the mishandling of this crisis by Paris, the AFSouth incident also revealed the real limits of U.S. political flexibility over transatlantic leadership. Tasksharing in the field (risking U.S. equipment and European lives) was one thing. Sharing leadership, especially in an area as sensitive for U.S. policy as the Eastern Mediterranean, was quite another. The Europeans had already experienced the U.S. approach to leadership in the 1995 resolution of the Bosnian War. U.S. bombers and Richard Holbrooke's strong-arm tactics at Dayton achieved in a few weeks what the Europeans had failed to achieve in three years. The European delegations at Dayton were shocked by the brutal unilateralism of the U.S. "negotiators."[19] The final straw seemed to come at the European Council meeting in Amsterdam in June 1997 when, citing NATO primacy, the newly elected Blair government, in its first major security policy decision, vetoed a proposal by nine EU member states to merge the EU with the WEU—as a means of conferring upon the former some of the military attributes of the latter. The explanation offered by London was that the EU–WEU merger proposal would weaken NATO.

Intriguing though it seemed for a time, the WEU "solution" thus proved to be an impasse. By 1997, WEU was perceived by many key analysts as part of (if not *the*) problem rather than as part of (if not *the*) solution. Politically, it perpetuated the unhealthy imbalance between the EU and the United States, the rectification of which was at the heart of the European security conundrum. Institutionally, it still left the EU impotent in terms of decision making. Militarily, it enshrined the EU's dependency on NATO/U.S. assets and capabilities without offering any long-term guarantees that such assets and capabilities would actually be available in the event of a crisis. The crises in the Balkans in the early 1990s—rendered even more dramatic by 1997–1998 with the looming conflict in Kosovo—had demonstrated to the EU the unsatisfactory nature of such a series of handicaps.

The Drive for Autonomy: From Saint-Malo to ESDP

A new approach was urgent. It came with the Franco-British *Declaration* at the Saint-Malo (France) summit orchestrated by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac in December 1998.[20] By positing the need for "appropriate structures" to be established *within* the EU, for the EU itself to acquire "the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces," and for an EU contribution to "the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance," the Saint-Malo Declaration went directly to the heart of the European security conundrum.

The immediate logical corollary to Saint-Malo was the construction, within the EU, of a common ESDP.[21] At the European Council in Cologne (June 1999), the EU announced its intention to develop an ESDP and outlined an institutional framework for the new policy that would be put in place by March 2000. The key security and defense institutions included: a High Representative for CFSP (now Javier Solana, former secretary-general of NATO); a Political and Security Committee (usually referred to by its French acronym, COPS), composed of senior officials from each EU member state, whose function is to monitor crisis situations and offer advice to the European Council; a European Military Committee (EUMC), the highest EU military body, composed of the chiefs of the defense staffs of the EU member states; and a European Military Staff (EUMS) to work under the military direction of the EUMC.[22]

The Helsinki European Council meeting of December 1999 formally launched the new institutions of ESDP and also established a military

"Headline Goal" involving the creation of a European armed force capable of significant humanitarian, crisis-management and even peace enforcement operations. The EU pledged that by December 2003 it would have a corps-level force (60,000 troops) capable of rapid deployment within 60 days and sustainable for at least one year. This capability was intended to enable the conduct of effective EU-led military operations, with or without recourse to NATO assets, as well as to provide a full contribution to NATO-led operations.[23]

The Saint-Malo/ESDP initiative responded in many ways to the repeated calls from Capitol Hill for the Europeans to get their act together, yet it produced an ambivalent reaction inside the DC beltway. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright immediately countered with her famous "3-Ds," giving guarded support to the project on condition that there was no: *d*ecoupling, *d*uplication or *d*iscrimination.[24] Nine months later, these concerns, still dominant in Washington, were articulated in the by now classic warning from Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott: "We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO, but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO."[25]

The problem by then was that *ESDI* had already ceased to be the primary focus of European efforts. At the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the ESDP project had been launched and European *autonomy* (at both political and military levels) had become an aspiration widely accepted across the EU as both legitimate and necessary. Moreover, although no EU member state (including France) had any explicit desire to weaken the Atlantic Alliance, still less to enter into competition with NATO or the United States, none could really foretell what the future would hold or what would be the eventual nature of the Atlantic Alliance. From the perspective of Washington, nevertheless, the launch of ESDP could be read as a reckless leap into the dark on the part of an EU that had totally inadequate military capacity, no significant plans to raise military budgets and that appeared obsessed with institutional engineering in Brussels rather than with the more serious business of acquiring the wherewithal to deliver genuine security in the European theater. The Europeans might whine about U.S. hegemony or "hyperpower," but they were manifestly in no position either to challenge it or to replace it.

Strobe Talbott's remark that "NATO, after all, is about the long term" appeared to the Europeans to carry two implications: first, that the alliance should best confront the long term by remaining what it had always been—rather than by embarking on controversial new

projects; second, that it was the Europeans who were rocking the boat. But from a European perspective, neither of these implications withstood serious scrutiny. The fact that Saint-Malo had happened could be attributed first and foremost to U.S. pressure over burden sharing, coupled with a clear reluctance in Washington to share leadership. It also reflected growing confidence on the part of an EU intent on becoming a regional military actor. Moreover, far from it being the Europeans who were endangering the future of the alliance,[26] it was widely perceived in Europe—particularly after Dayton, NATO enlargement and Kosovo—that it was the uncompromising and domineering Americans who were undermining the bases of the transatlantic partnership.[27]

As the Clinton administration prepared to hand over the reins to the Bush administration in late 2000, the residual tensions over the ESDP project remained very active. The final speech of outgoing Secretary of Defense William Cohen, to the NATO meeting in Brussels in December 2000,[28] was as uncompromising in its ambivalence toward ESDP as was the first major speech by incoming Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to the *Wehrkunde* in February 2001.[29] But by then, other bones of contention had appeared, which soon had the two sides not merely growling at one another but snapping at one another's heels. The litany of contestation included American plans for a defensive missile shield against so-called "rogue states," dismissive or hostile attitudes toward Russia and China, refusal to sign new—or even retain commitments to traditional— international treaties and conventions (the Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention, the International Criminal Court, the Biological Weapons Convention, the ABM Treaty), lack of pro-activism in the deteriorating Middle East peace process, to which were added a host of cultural factors such as the controversy over the death penalty, or commercial squabbles over hormone-treated beef or bananas. In the summer of 2001, despite an orchestrated Bush charm offensive—which saw the introduction of "chemistry" into international relations as the U.S. president struck up seemingly close personal relations with Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and above all Russian President Vladimir Putin—the balance sheet of EU–U.S. relations seemed about as negative as it had been for a very long time.

The Impact of September 11, 2001

Then along came Osama bin Laden. The September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington rendered even more complex than previously the transatlantic quest for a new, restructured, post–Cold War

alliance. Whereas in the initial weeks after the attacks the Bush administration appeared to have abandoned unilateralism in favor of coalition building, consultation and restraint, the European allies appeared to have taken the opposite course, engaging in a *de facto* form of renationalization of their security thinking. National leaders expressed solidarity with the United States—on behalf of their respective countries. Each pledged *national* military assets to the U.S. administration—which Washington, at least initially, ignored. Most European leaders, with the notable exception of Britain's Tony Blair, insisted that the emerging campaign against Al-Quaeda was not a "war," and that attention had to be paid to the root causes of terrorism. Most leaders, with the notable exception of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, also expressed their respect for Islam and Muslim nations. Yet there was something of a cacophony between those insisting that U.S. military retaliation should be tightly "targeted" and those (including, surprisingly, Germany) who offered "unlimited" support to the U.S. military effort. Some managed to articulate both.

This heterogeneity of response was best symbolized by two highly publicized events. The first was the October 2001 European Council meeting in Ghent, which was preceded by a tripartite conclave featuring Chirac/Jospin, Blair and Schröder to discuss the (as yet hypothetical) military involvement of their respective national forces in Afghanistan. This crude attempt to organize a widely resented *Directoire* overshadowed the substantive decisions of the Council itself. The triumvirate planned to meet again on November 5 in London, but this time a cozy *dîner à trois* was gate-crashed by a variety of other European leaders, highlighting once again the disorderly ranks of first, second and third division players, allies and neutrals, "militarists" and "pacifists," and one ESDP opt-out (Denmark). This feature enormously complicated the ESDP work of the Belgian presidency, struggling to impose its authority in the context of high-profile solo diplomacy on the part of Europe's big three.

Above all, it was Tony Blair's crusading leadership style that, while commanding respect, also fostered divisiveness. Acting *as UK prime minister* rather than as spokesperson for the EU (a role that could have been his), Blair threw himself into personal shuttle diplomacy on behalf of the U.S. administration. NATO's September 12 invocation of Article V emanated from a telephone conversation between Blair and the Alliance's secretary-general, Lord Robertson. Did this amount to unconditional EU alignment on U.S. policy?

Paradoxically, NATO's invocation of Article V, high in political symbolism, could prove to be the historical swan song of the Alliance

as a military instrument. It also helps explain why, despite the short-term disorder of European responses to September 11, the longer-term dynamics of ESDP are likely to be reinforced.[30] Although NATO adopted a series of measures in mid-September 2001 to enhance intelligence sharing, increase security of Alliance facilities, guarantee blanket overflight for allied aircraft, and redeploy certain naval assets to the Eastern Mediterranean, these must be regarded as the bare minimum given the gravity of the crisis. The United States, while reengaging tentatively with a number of multilateral institutions (particularly the United Nations), preferred to discuss *military* cooperation via multiple bilateralisms rather than through the framework of the Alliance itself. Why?

Throughout the 1990s, several U.S. leaders had been calling for NATO to go "out of area or out of business." No longer perceiving Europe to be central to U.S. security interests, they proposed a global deal whereby Europe might acquire regional security autonomy in exchange for political and possibly even military support for U.S. policy across the globe.[31] The Europeans, preoccupied with their own backyard, remained uninterested. On October 7, 2001, in the skies over Afghanistan, the United States went "out of area"—unilaterally. Although Washington eventually associated with its military efforts small numbers of cherry-picked European forces, and although NATO's contribution in terms of logistics and infrastructure was not insignificant, the Afghan War was anything but a NATO operation.

European nations, in proffering their troops, may well have hoped to lock the United States into a multilateral campaign legitimized by the United Nations (UN). The reality was that, despite the coalition-building efforts of the State Department, U.S. instincts remained deeply unilateral. By mid-November, transatlantic tensions were multiplying. The Europeans prioritized the political over the military; humanitarian relief over further escalation of the war on terrorism; the quest for a balanced Middle East settlement over blanket support for Israel; and a long-term commitment to stabilization in Afghanistan over the hunt for Bin Laden. Did the unilateral U.S. shift to "out of area" therefore imply that NATO was destined to go "out of business"? No. NATO will survive. But it will be further transformed from an essentially military organization to an essentially political one.[32] Enlargement from Central and Eastern Europe, announced at the Alliance's Prague summit in November 2002, will accelerate the Alliance's transformation from a collective defense to a collective security agency. The new upgraded relationship with Russia—formalized in May 2002 with the signing of a new partnership agreement between Russia and NATO—will

intensify and accelerate that development. In the war against terrorism, in the campaign against weapons of mass destruction and in regional peacekeeping tasks, Russia is likely to share center stage with the United States and the EU. An Alliance with less U.S. military involvement and more participation from former Warsaw Pact members will be a very different actor from the body founded in 1949.

This brings ESDP even more prominently into the spotlight. Despite the immediate phenomenon of *renationalization*, analysts and actors agree that, in the longer term, September 11 made the case for ESDP even more compelling. Beyond the probe of the cameras, significant elements of integration emerged. ESDP institutional turf wars were set aside and the complex EU nexus of agencies and actors worked seamlessly together to develop a coherent political approach to the crisis. Within ten days, the main outlines had been agreed on and were articulated at the extraordinary meeting of the European Council on September 21, 2001. Beyond the expression of "total support" for the *American people* and recognition that UN Security Council resolution 1368 made a U.S. military riposte "legitimate," a relatively distinct EU political agenda suggested a longer-term approach to the global crisis. First, the creation of the "broadest possible global coalition against terrorism *under United Nations aegis*" (emphasis added). Second, major political emphasis on reactivating the Middle East peace process on the basis of the Mitchell and Tenet reports.[33] Third, the "integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development." Humanitarian relief for Afghanistan and its neighbors became a number one priority. Europe's ESDP leaders, in various combinations, embarked on an unprecedented round of shuttle diplomacy, repeatedly visiting most countries of Central and South Asia and the Middle East in a relentless quest for dialogue. The EU, despite its obvious shortcomings, was emerging as an international actor.

The EU also intensified overtures toward its neighbors, with heightened diplomatic activity toward Russia, the Mediterranean and Turkey. These coordinated efforts bore fruit. Russia became an increasingly qualitative partner, not only on trade (the move toward a "Common European Economic Area") but also in the field of security. Monthly meetings began between Russia and the EU's COPS. A Euro-Mediterranean Conference of foreign ministers (5–6 November) highlighted a commonality of purpose in the fields of economic development, anti-terrorism, cultural exchanges and security. Above all, an apparent breakthrough was finally announced (early December) in the long-standing impasse over Turkey's refusal to play ball with ESDP.[34]

Military capacity remains the one crucial problem. The war against terrorism may well be more effectively conducted through civilian, police and intelligence instruments than through smart bombs. Checkbook diplomacy and a concentration on development aid and the reconstruction of civil society are appropriate foreign and security priorities for an EU not seeking to become a military superpower. But the carrot without the stick is a less effective instrument than the carrot backed by the stick. At the *Capabilities Improvement Conference* on November 19, 2001, the EU began to make headway toward rectifying the considerable deficiencies in its military "Force Catalogue." But progress was minimal. Despite an optimistically worded report, and despite the controversial declaration of ESDP "operationality" at the December 2001 Laeken European Council meeting, most analysts concur with London's *International Institute for Strategic Studies* that the EU has still "fail[ed] to grasp the severity of the looming crisis" and that "final operating capability" is unlikely to be met before 2012.[35] The EU's military inadequacy, compounded by the likely unavailability of U.S. assets, thus remains the Achilles heel of the ESDP project.

The Organization of the Book

The chapters to follow, written by ten different scholars from Britain, France, Norway, the United States and Canada, will elaborate on the themes highlighted above and provide contrasting perspectives on the development of European policy and its implications for the Atlantic Alliance. The three chapters of Part I will explore more fully, in broad terms, the evolution of NATO and the development of ESDI/ESDP. In chapter 2, Alexander Moens (Simon Fraser University, Canada) explains how the ESDP project has advanced with the support of the three major West European powers and why the United States has supported the initiative despite the objectionable rhetoric of some of its advocates. He also places ESDP in the context of the process of European integration and argues that, like the development of the single currency (the Euro), the creation of a viable EU capacity for military action may take as long as two decades.

In chapter 3, Terry Terriff (University of Birmingham, U.K.) explains how NATO has developed since the mid-1990s the notion of CJTFs as a pivotal part of its commitment to a new ESDI. His major contribution is to clarify how and why the prospect of employing CJTF HQs as command instruments for Europe-led military operations has become less and less attractive, for both political and military reasons, to many

European officials and security experts. In technical-military terms, as Terriff demonstrates, one of the most important and controversial dimensions of the European shift from ESDI to a more autonomous ESDP is the EU's ambition to obviate reliance on a NATO-operated CJTF HQ by developing its own operational HQ.

Chapter 4 by Frédéric Bozo (University of Nantes, France) argues that the Kosovo crisis revealed that a huge gap was threatening to open up between Europe and the United States in regard to capabilities, responsibilities and strategic priorities. In so doing, Kosovo represented a "moment of truth for NATO," exposing structural flaws with the potential to lead to a virtual decoupling of the transatlantic allies. From the Kosovo experience the United States has drawn the lesson that the allies must be required to play a larger military role in the future, while Europeans have tended to deduce that what is required is a greater willingness by the United States to share decision-making power. Yet Kosovo has also served to propel the EU into launching the ESDP project, which Bozo sees as opening the way for a new grand transatlantic bargain: a rebalanced alliance, in which the Europeans play a more assertive, autonomous role and gain acceptance for this by Americans who welcome their unprecedented seriousness of purpose in the defense sphere.

Part II explores in detail the crucial issue of the Euro-American capabilities gap. In chapter 5, David Yost (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey) begins by noting that "the gap" is properly viewed as the aggregate of many gaps—in technology, investment and procurement—that add up to U.S. superiority, not only quantitative but also qualitative, in military capacity. He then traces the origins of the gap, discusses the importance of the gap in the Kosovo War, and highlights the implications of the gap for the conduct of NATO military operations and transatlantic relations. His conclusion, very sobering for passionate advocates of ESDP, is that a variety of "stubborn facts" will make it extremely difficult for the EU—or even its central players in this sphere, Britain and France—to increase defense spending substantially so as to make significant improvements in European military capabilities.

In chapter 6, Kori Schake (National Defense University, Washington and National Security Council) examines the issue of duplication of NATO's military assets. She demonstrates that while initially there may well have been concern in Washington about the *competitive potential* of ESDP on the military procurement front, it soon became clear that the opposite was, in fact, the case: that the EU ran the risk of failing significantly to procure the weapons systems necessary to engage in high-end

Petersberg missions. Schake examines in some detail the case for "constructive duplication," a course that would ensure that the EU should not be dependent on U.S. systems in a situation where those systems might well be unavailable to putative EU-led missions. Constructive duplication, she demonstrates, would actually benefit both main pillars of the Alliance by creating an adequate pool of military instruments to confront the challenges of the twenty-first century. However, she also notes that the sort of improvements in capability she suggests would require the EU to increase defense spending by 10 percent per year—a figure that Yost and others deem politically impossible to achieve.

Part III examines the complications posed for the development of ESDP by the issue of "discrimination" (by the EU against the six European non-EU NATO members) and the prospect of NATO/EU enlargement. In chapter 7, Sunniva Tofte (University of Bath, U.K.) illuminates the sensitive matter of discrimination by concentrating on the two non-EU allies—Turkey and Norway—most affected by the ESDP project. She argues that both countries, for rather different reasons, have strong incentives to prefer the *status quo ante*, but demonstrates that both have begun to take the measure of ESDP and to adapt their defense and security policies accordingly. Although the asymmetrical relationship between EU/NATO membership carries within it the seeds of multiple tensions for the future, a formula for mutually acceptable non-EU allied involvement in ESDP is likely to be achieved in the not too distant future. All parties involved, as Tofte notes, have too much political capital invested in the process for this not to happen.

In chapter 8, Mark Webber (University of Loughborough, U.K.) focuses on the ways in which the ongoing enlargement of NATO—and the EU—has complicated the development of ESDI/ESDP. He addresses such issues as the concerns of the new post-Communist NATO members (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic), the debates over how the EU should involve the thirteen EU accession candidates and the six non-EU NATO states, the problem of "backdoor commitments," the possibility that enlargement may generate a substantial anti-ESDP European caucus within NATO, and the multifaceted effects of September 11. Webber concludes by explaining that the extent to which the NATO–EU/ESDP institutional interface matters will ultimately depend on whether or not ESDP obtains real material substance. Chapter 9 by Julian Lindley-French (European Union Institute for Strategic Studies) covers some of the same ground as chapter 8, but it provides a different perspective by concentrating on dilemmas that NATO enlargement poses for the Atlantic Alliance, by developing a sharp critique of American policy

within the Alliance, and by proposing a variety of reforms to rebalance and strengthen NATO.

The final section reflects the intensity of current debates by presenting two contrary conclusions regarding the EU's quest for autonomy within the Atlantic Alliance. Anand Menon (University of Birmingham, U.K.) makes the case for opposing ESDP as misguided and potentially dangerous for the EU and the Alliance. In contrast, Jolyon Howorth (University of Bath, U.K.) argues that ESDP is necessary for the EU and, in the long run, almost certainly in the interests of the Alliance.

Notes

1. Timothy Garton Ash, "The Peril of Too Much Power," *New York Times*, April 9, 2002.
2. Ibid.
3. J.L. Gaddis, "The US and the Question of a Sphere of Influence in Europe," in O. Riste, ed., *Western Security: The Formative Years* (Oslo: Universitetsvorlaget, 1985), p. 78.
4. Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 153.
5. Georges-Henri Soutou, "Le Général de Gaulle et le plan Fouchet, in *De Gaulle en son siècle: 5. L'Europe* (Paris: Plon, 1992), pp. 126–144.
6. David Allen, R. Rummel and W. Wessels, eds., *European Political Cooperation: Toward a Foreign Policy for Western Europe* (London: Butterworth, 1982), p. 2.
7. Western European Union, *The Reactivation of WEU: Statements and Communications 1984–1987* (London: WEU, 1988), p. 37.
8. In reality, only EDC and Fouchet were clear "failures." The thinking behind "Western Union" was remarkably similar to current ESDP thinking, and EPC led naturally into CFSP, which currently goes from strength to strength.
9. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (1990); Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 14 (1990).
10. Jolyon Howorth, "Renegotiating the Marriage Contract: Franco-American Relations since 1981," in Sabrina P. Ramet and Christine Ingebritsen, eds., *Coming in from the Cold War: Changes in US–European Interactions since 1980* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
11. Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," *Survival* 33 (1991), pp. 99–110.
12. Catherine Kelleher, *The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment* (Washington: Brookings, 1995).
13. Stuart Croft, "The EU, NATO and Europeanization: The Return of Architectural Debate," *European Security* 9 (Autumn 2000), pp. 1–20.

14. Stanley R. Sloan, "Burdensharing in NATO: The US and Transatlantic Burdensharing," *Les Notes de l'IFRI* 12 (Paris: IFRI, 1999), p. 12.
15. Non-EU NATO members were known as "associate members." Non-NATO EU members were offered "observer" status, and EU/NATO accession candidates from Central and Eastern Europe were offered "associate partnership." Although this involved all possible partners, it did not increase the effectiveness of the WEU as an organization.
16. Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?* (Paris: WEU-ISS, 2000), Chaillot Paper 43.
17. Ibid., p. 24.
18. Guillaume Parmentier, "NATO: Lost Opportunities," in Michael Brenner and Guillaume Parmentier, eds., *Reconcilable Difference: US–French Relations in the New Era* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2002).
19. See the testimony of a member of the British delegation, Pauline Neville-Jones, "Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia," *Survival* 38 (1996/7), pp. 45–65.
20. The text of the Saint-Malo Declaration (as well as most of the key speeches, documents, and texts on European security since 1998) can be found in Maartje Rutten, ed., *From Saint-Malo to Nice: European Defence—Core Documents* (Paris: WEU-ISS, 2001), Cahiers de Chaillot 47; 2001 documents in Maartje Rutten, ed., *From Nice to Laeken. European Defence—Core Documents* 2 (Paris: EU-ISS, 2002), Chaillot Paper 51, 2002.
21. Since the European Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999, ESDP has often been referred to as CESDP, in part to distinguish it better from ESDI.
22. Howorth, *European Integration and Defence*, pp. 32–33.
23. Ibid., pp. 37–38.
24. Madeleine K. Albright, "The Right Balance will Secure NATO's Future," *Financial Times*, December 7, 1998.
25. Strobe Talbott, "America's Stake in a Strong Europe," Speech to Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, October 7, 1999.
26. From the British perspective, Saint-Malo was largely about saving NATO from imminent demise. See Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 5 (2000), pp. 1–20.
27. The Dayton Agreement that put an end to the Bosnian War was practically *imposed* both on the Balkan delegations and also on the European delegations that attended the meeting in Dayton, Ohio, in the summer of 1995; in May 1997, it was the United States that unilaterally dictated the designation of the new members of the Alliance. During the Kosovo War, U.S. military leadership was so total that the Europeans vowed "never again" to allow themselves to be reduced to a sideshow. The United States, for its part, vowed "never again" to allow the fractious European allies to retain political oversight over a complex military operation ("war by committee"). Kosovo, as Frédéric Bozo argues in chapter 4, was the real beginning of the end of the Alliance as a predominantly military instrument.

28. Cohen warned that NATO risked becoming "a relic" if ESDP were not kept on a tight leash; cited in Rutten (2001).
29. Rumsfeld argued that ESDP was a very dangerous path to tread; cited in Rutten (2002).
30. Charles Grant, "A Stronger European Foreign and Defense policy," in Edward Bannerman et al., eds., *Europe after September 11th* (London, Centre for European Reform, December 2001), pp. 31–48.
31. F. Stephen Larrabee and David Gompert, *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
32. Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "What is NATO for?" *Survival* 43 (2002), pp. 107–122. See also Anatole Lieven, "The End of NATO," *Prospect*, December 2001, pp. 14–15.
33. Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell presented a plan to end the *intifada* in May 2001 that met with reservations from Israel. George Tenet, director of the CIA, then refined the plan with concrete proposals for a ceasefire and withdrawal to positions held in September 2000.
34. The so-called "Istanbul document" was accepted by Turkey in December 2001, but the terms of the agreement were subsequently refused by Greece. See Sunniva Tofte's account of this in chapter 7.
35. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2001–2002* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 291.