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CHAPTER 9

Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement

Julian Lindley-French

At NATO's Madrid Summit in July 1997, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to join the Alliance. The Alliance also committed itself to "extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership."[1] So far, so good. However, enlargement is, in many ways, an affliction, not just for the Alliance but also for the EU. Indeed, the two enlargements are intrinsically linked because the stabilization of the European security space is as much (if not more) about economic security, as military. Although they are linked they are not politically compatible, and because of the political complications they entail and the pressures they create enlargement undoubtedly destabilizes transatlantic relations at a time when the emphasis is on the search for a new political bargain between traditional members. This search is lent some urgency by the election of a new administration seemingly less predisposed toward Europe and the allies, and yet for whom enlargement, of both the EU and NATO, remains a sine qua non of the wider relationship.

There is, therefore, a certain degree of political incoherence between the allies as, on the one hand, NATO attempts to become a more political organization while, on the other, the EU endeavors to become more military. This takes place against the backdrop of Kosovo that demonstrated that NATO must be able to *act* in pursuit of security as well as *exist* in the interests of security. Deterrence must be backed up by

credible conventional capability. Enlargement tests that balance because it redefines the political mission, complicates decision making, creates a diffuse security role for the Alliance, reduces the qualitative level of military-operational effectiveness and costs a lot of money—money that no one seems willing to spend.

Consequently, the internal and external pressures upon NATO as an organization are profound and becoming steadily more so as Europe and America drift into a dysfunctional strategic relationship in which there is little or no consensus over the risks and threats that must be confronted or the solutions that must be found. Missile defense, European defense, sanctions against Iraq are but three areas where a profound malaise in the relationship manifests itself. Moreover, NATO enlargement cannot be neatly packaged or quarantined from those tensions. Indeed, in many ways, the process will become a litmus test for the state of transatlantic relations as the debate over extending the security umbrella meets head on the need for greater military efficiency. Not surprisingly, the 2002 NATO Review Conference, which will assess the progress made on enlargement and decide who next will be offered full membership, is likely to prove an exacting and delicate affair.

In the fog of a peaceful but vaguely unstable European continent, what cannot be denied is that the political heart of the Alliance is changing radically and it is difficult to assess what the outcome will be. Unfortunately, such change seems poorly appreciated in the United States, particularly in a Congress that has driven much of the enlargement process. Consequently, the United States will doubtless react to this perceived drift in its now time-honored way by attempting to reassert U.S. leadership when the rhetoric of partnership would probably be more politically effective. This dichotomy in both the policy positions and perceptions of Americans and Europeans covers all the issues that cause contention in the transatlantic relationship, not just enlargement. In addition to the tensions over the strategic direction of the Alliance, there are a host of more immediate problems. NATO–EU relations, a redefinition of burden sharing in a complex security environment that requires holistic, civil–military approaches (including civilian aid programs), the policy toward Russia and, of course, U.S.–European disagreements over an extra-European role for NATO. Certainly, it is a challenge to see how further enlargement can take place without some sort of settlement between the United States and its allies over the future shape and role of the Alliance. There is also a degree of urgency because, as the EU is now finding to its cost, failed promises not only complicate relations with candidate countries but also

create a climate of insecurity, which is precisely the outcome the process seeks to avoid.

Implications of Enlargement for NATO: The Legitimacy/Effectiveness Dilemma

NATO enlargement is paradoxical because while embracing states in a security regime is normally deemed to reinforce its strength this is by no means automatically the case, either in the wider context of European security or in the case of NATO. Indeed, enlargement brings as many complications to the Alliance, both political and functional, as security benefits. As early as January 1996, Gebhardt von Moltke, NATO's assistant secretary general for Political Affairs, wrote "Allies will want to know how possible new members intend to contribute to NATO's tasks..."[2] In this respect, an enlarged NATO is a leap in the dark because no one really knows how successive enlargements will change the political balance and/or the military efficiency of the Alliance.

At the military level there will certainly be no NATO standard of military capability. Indeed, there are already four levels of military capability in the Alliance—the United States, which is vanishing into the military-technical distance, the United Kingdom and France, which find themselves floating in the military mid-Atlantic, the other continental Western Europeans and, finally, the new members. Moreover, if the partner countries are added to this politico-military soup then the problem becomes even more complex. The most likely outcome, therefore, is that NATO will come to resemble a military "clearing house"—a kind of interoperability nexus in which asymmetrical capabilities are cobbled together in some form of (hopefully) working politico-military mechanism.

At best, an enlarged NATO could help to reinforce interlocking institutions, underpin NATO–EU relations and, in cooperation with the OSCE, establish a broad security guarantee in the European security space. At worst, an enlarged NATO could push Russia toward an aggressive posture, duplicate OSCE, reinforce the military role of the EU as juxtaposition to that of NATO and undermine the basic political consensus and military mission of the Alliance. NATO enlargement, therefore, is a risk—a cost-benefit exercise in which the Alliance must confront exactly the same "deepening" and "widening" dilemma that the EU faces. In the absence of a systemic threat American hegemony loses its ability to influence by cooptive means. Indeed, hegemony is not what it used to be. Consequently, at a time of supreme American power, the

United States will find leadership increasingly difficult to assert within an Alliance more fractious, more divided and more political than at any time in its history.

This will also lead progressively (irony of ironies) to a NATO that more resembles the political machinations of the EU. Thus, the position of the European members will be further reinforced because they have fifty years experience of playing the kind of games that are part and parcel of Brussels daily life across town from NATO. In such a situation the new members are likely to be disappointed because the NATO they join is unlikely to be the NATO they want. Moreover, they themselves are faced with a choice: spend limited resources on bringing their armed forces up to NATO standard or embark on the thoroughgoing economic reform required to prepare for EU membership.

The complexity of contemporary Alliance and European politics is already constraining the Alliance. First, the reform of the armed forces of both new members and aspirant countries is proving extremely slow and complex. Indeed, the mechanisms for "self-improvement," such as the Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs), Membership Action Plans (MAPs) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) tend to underline the extent of problems, rather than offer any meaningful solutions. Second, as indicated earlier, NATO was built around a core political understanding and an asymmetric political and military partnership between North America and Western Europe, led by the United States. Enlargement takes place at a time when that balance is being disturbed not only by Western Europe's legitimate political ambitions but also by the demands of a new group of members who are not so much partners as clients. Third, enlargement transfers security risks from beyond NATO's borders to within them, which further complicates the nature of the Alliance and bifurcates its mission. Fourth, by creating the expectation of enlargement, NATO creates winners and losers with those "excluded," such as Ukraine, needing constant reassurance to avoid the overt reestablishment of the very dividing lines in Europe that NATO seeks to prevent. Fifth, the paraphernalia of enlargement have expanded over the past decade in inverse proportion to the political will necessary to make it happen. Indeed, the architecture of quasi-enlargement has become an industry: the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the PfP, the NATO–Russian Permanent Joint Council, the Committee of National Armaments Directors with Partners (CNAD with Partners). They place a disproportionate burden on a bureaucracy that is ill suited to the task, is badly underfunded and that still needs urgently to attend to existing core functions, such as ESDI and the DCI. NATO is in need of reform.

Not surprisingly, as a result of these many conflicting forces and inconsistent positions, NATO is going about enlargement in an almost ad hoc manner, with neither the political nor the practical implications being properly addressed. Indeed, in spite of the many declarations to the contrary, there is no political roadmap guiding the allies on the path to enlargement—no agreed timetable, no agreed order of prospective members, no plan of action. NATO is muddling through enlargement because the members lack sufficient political cohesion to will either its means or its ends.

Implications for the EU: The Asymmetric Membership Dilemma

The report of the French presidency of the EU to the Nice summit in December 2000 stated: "The Union will ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with NATO and its non-EU members, other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU as well as other prospective partners in EU-led crisis management, with full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the single institutional framework of the Union."[3] In EU-speak that means the great and the good have absolutely no idea how the relationship with the candidate/accession countries is going to work in practice.

Certainly, NATO enlargement creates problems for the EU. First, it increases the political pressure on the EU to enlarge itself. Second, it reinforces asymmetric memberships that further complicate interinstitutional relations between the EU and NATO. There are fifteen candidate countries seeking to "accede" to the EU, among them Turkey which, although a full member of the Alliance, finds its candidature for the EU perpetually on the back burner. The "word on the street" is that 2006 will be the earliest that the first wave of EU enlargement will take place, in spite of recent reassuring comments from British Prime Minister Tony Blair.[4] The Alliance is not much better. In 2002 NATO is, at best, likely only to offer full membership to Romania, Slovenia and possibly Lithuania. The complexity of their respective enlargements leaves NATO and the EU politically paralyzed with the result that everybody, member and candidate alike, find themselves in a kind of political no mans land. The recent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on reform of EU institutions in preparation for EU enlargement underlined the sheer complexity of the process, and served only to demonstrate that progress is by no means certain.

In practice it is very hard to separate the two enlargements in the minds of those who aspire to be members of the two organizations.

Previously, there was a trade-off between economic security and military security by which candidates sought a U.S. security guarantee alongside an EU economic "guarantee." Indeed, that was the implicit "deal" between the United States and its allies. However, the United States has become increasingly concerned that EU membership means a "back-door" security guarantee from NATO for EU members, thus implying an involuntary extension of U.S. commitments in Europe. To counter this, the debate in the early 1990s centered upon the need for parallel enlargements, but that goal proved to be politically and practically impossible. The United States had a point. The debate that took place in Finland in the run up to their accession to the EU was often heavily laced with references to the security that the country would gain from EU membership. Given the relative paucity of EU military capabilities and that Finland's main security concern has been and remains Russia, they were not voting for a EU security guarantee. Through ESDP a European guarantee may one day prove feasible, but not for the foreseeable future (and is hardly likely to enjoy U.S. support).

This interinstitutional imbroglio is further complicated by the pressure emanating from those in Washington who see EU enlargement as a commitment to what they regard as asymmetric burden-sharing, whereby the U.S. military commitment *to* Europe is offset by the EU's economic investment in Europe. Thus, there is a fine balance between the forces pushing the EU to enlarge (including NATO enlargement) and the many pressures from within it to delay. It is also a debate fraught with difficulty because there are undoubtedly some in the United States (and United Kingdom) who believe that a wider Europe will mean less Europe and those in Europe who believe that a wider Alliance will mean less America.

One solution could be for the EU member states to opt for a kind of "virtual enlargement" in which non-EU, NATO allies and, indeed, partners, are invited to formalize the decision-shaping formula through a kind of EU "Partnership for Peace." In effect, this would be an extension of Pillar Two of the Treaty on EU (i.e., the intergovernmental CFSP). There is already pressure from some EU accession states to "join" Pillar Two before they are fully admitted to the rest of the Treaty on European Union.[5] Certainly, if NATO embarks upon a second wave of enlargement before the EU has even reached the starting post, the problem of block-building within the Alliance will become more acute as *Western* European interests become increasingly distinct, by contrast to those of other members, irrespective of the final shape of NATO enlargement. This would also help ease the problem of EU-caucusing

within the Alliance that NATO enlargement tends to reinforce because it further dilutes a single European position. EU-caucusing is not Euro-caucusing and so long as there is an imbalance between the two enlargements Western Europeans will tend to see their interests as being distinct from their Central and Eastern European neighbors. Moreover, in many ways EU-caucusing is as inevitable as it is desirable because of the need for a functioning mechanism that can adequately reflect the changing political balance of power in the Alliance. Indeed, it is simply a reflection of political reality. Ultimately, there will only be true symbiosis between the two enlargements if both sides to the transatlantic security bargain recognize that membership of either will afford the same security guarantee.

Implications for the "Neutrals": The Are We, Aren't We Dilemma

The debate over NATO and EU enlargement is also having a significant impact upon how the so-called "neutrals" see themselves. Neutrality is no longer really an option for any EU member state, at least in the strict sense of the term. Even that doyen of neutrality, Switzerland, has compromised itself to an extent by joining NATO's PfP. This is a reflection of geo-political change that is also encouraging a reevaluation in other "hard-line" neutrals, such as Sweden and Ireland. Having joined the EU they are now engaged in often-tortured debates about what is the purpose and, indeed, the benefit to be derived from neutrality in a postmodern world, including whether or not NATO membership is an option in the medium to long term. Moreover, although the EU's autonomous capacity is still more autonomous than capable, the fact that it exists exerts increased pressure upon them to come off the neutral fence. It is hard to imagine a scenario in which a NATO member is confronted with a major challenge to its security without the non-NATO "EU Four" (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) making some form of contribution. NATO enlargement will undoubtedly reinforce this tendency, which will, in turn, create not only pan-European mutually assured vulnerabilities but also the need for mutually reassuring commitments. Indeed, such commitments are already implicit in the EU's HG. Included in the planning framework for the EU's ERRF is a Committee of Contributors made up of non-EU European states. They will have what is termed a "decision-shaping" capability, although what that means exactly has yet to be defined. It is ironic that it is the foggy peace of post–Cold War Europe that is forcing an abandonment of

traditional neutrality, rather than the ideologically charged atmosphere of the Cold War.

Implications for Russia: The Partner/Adversary Dilemma

Russia is an enigma for the Alliance. At a superficial level important steps have been taken to reassure the Russians that NATO is no longer an anti-Russian coalition. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the creation of the NATO-Russian Joint Permanent Council, sought to frame a new relationship between the two former adversaries that committed the new partners to joint efforts to construct peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. To that end, the Act stated: "NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation."[6] However, much of Russia's relationship with the West hinges on NATO enlargement and, not surprisingly, there is a very distinct Russian point of view. "To hold out the prospect of NATO expanding to include the ECE [Eastern and Central European countries] would require simultaneous attempts to address Russia's real and alleged concerns about the future of European security. Otherwise the stated assumptions of all Western security policies—that Russia is in some meaningful sense a partner and the substantial decisions affecting its security should therefore not be made without full consideration of Russian interests, including detailed consultations with Moscow—could be considered in Russia as meaningless."[7] This Russian view of NATO enlargement not only sums up the Russian attitude—it encapsulates the West's dilemma. All Western governments would like partnership with Moscow but not at the price of giving the Russians an enduring veto over the future expansion of the Alliance. Equally, NATO cannot pretend that Russia does not exist. Unfortunately, the very name "NATO" is replete with negative implications for a Russian people who labored under forty years of state propaganda. NATO was the enemy and now it wants to move its eastern border ever closer to Mother Russia. It is powerful and it is emotive.

NATO has made great efforts to convince the Russians that enlargement is not aimed at it and although it has been repeatedly stressed that Moscow has no veto it is clear that much still depends on the Russian attitude. Unfortunately, Russia continues to suffer from a form of "Versailles Syndrome," with NATO enlargement being only the most visible sign of Russian "defeat." This is a tragedy, not just for Russia, but for the whole of Europe, because Russia still sees the end of the

Cold War in terms of a defeat and any developments that come thereafter as the imposing of terms by an arrogant victor. Thus, while the implications for Russia of NATO enlargement are not in themselves great, much depends on how Russia deals with it. Russian opposition will certainly have implications for the Alliance. As indicated earlier, the further east that NATO expands the more dilute Article V will become. Would the West go to war for the Baltics if Russia reinvaded? No. Would NATO go to war for Poland? Most certainly, yes. Therefore, it is a sad but inescapable conclusion that Russia's hostility to NATO enlargement continues to divide Europe and it is Russia who sets this particular agenda by choosing to see NATO enlargement in those terms. Consequently, it is also difficult to escape the conclusion that countries such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will only join a meaningful NATO when they are no longer in need of it.

It would appear, therefore, that the best that can be hoped for from Russia is a reluctant and grudging acceptance. It is as yet unclear how President Putin will react to further NATO enlargements, but early signs suggest a "lucrative" pragmatism if the NMD debate is anything to go by. He will certainly exact a price, both political and financial, for each wave of enlargement that takes place. Moreover, given the somewhat anachronistic (hard-line realist) bent to current Russian thinking, it seems reasonable to assume that "linkage" could well raise its ugly head again as the Russians demand further alterations to NMD, the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty or even European defense in return for grudging support for limited NATO enlargement. At the same time, it is certainly difficult to see how progressive NATO enlargement can take place if Russian opposition is implacable, at least if it involves any of the Baltic states. Indeed, if NATO enlargement simply makes Russia ever more hostile how can it be said to serve European security. That is, after all, the object of the exercise.

There is also something ironic and illogical about Russian negativity. A stabilized border to the West, which is implicit in NATO enlargement, would enable it to focus more effectively on dealing with the many zones of insecurity and instability to its south and east. However, that is the "charm" of Russia, a country whose painful history leads it perennially to confuse legitimate security concerns with those that are, frankly, illegitimate. One area of linkage that NATO must be careful to avoid is one in which enlargement is linked to domestic behavior. The West must not turn a blind eye to the manner by which Russia deals with its internal security concerns. Chechnya must not become an accepted norm. That said, it is impossible to overstate the psychological

impact of NATO enlargement on the Russian mind and it is beholden upon the West to use every means at its disposal to put these historical concerns to rest. NATO must, therefore, be sensitive to Russia without ever allowing it any right of veto. By all means trade the tradable, but not the inalienable.

Implications for the Candidate Countries: The Article V Dilemma

"The door to NATO membership remains open to other European countries that are ready and willing to undertake the commitments and obligations stemming from NATO membership and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The admission of new democratic members into NATO is itself part of a wider process of greater integration in Europe involving other European institutions."[8] The NATO enlargement debate all too often has an unfortunate tendency to be discussed within the Alliance as though the candidate countries are a theoretical device. There is always much talk about the interests and burdens of existing members and often little about the legitimate aspirations and security needs of candidate countries. Unfortunately, there are no quick solutions to this problem because, contrary to Joschka Fischer's now famous view, widening does affect deepening and it makes little sense to pretend otherwise. Indeed, a NATO of twenty-three, twenty-eight, or in the longer run, even thirty plus, would probably find unanimity of purpose in an ever more complex security environment only at the expense of democratic representation. Unfortunately, as the EU knows only too well, to be effective unanimity is not an option, whereas to be democratic, neither is effectiveness. NATO must get used to a world that is even more suboptimal than the one it currently occupies.

NATO must avoid becoming simply a more muscular OSCE. Consequently, NATO enlargement is a dilemma for the candidate countries. They want to join the Alliance because of what it *was*. Unfortunately, their very membership changes NATO making it less attractive as a military security "product." Radu Bogdan captures the problem succinctly by posing a couple of questions: "NATO has committed itself to reviewing the enlargement process in 2002. In the meantime there will of course be much debate. Could the Alliance remain functional if it were much further enlarged? How many new members should be invited to join, in what order and how fast?"[9] The problem is centered upon Article V of the Treaty of Washington, NATO's founding act. Indeed, it is Article V that candidate countries

really want because it implies an automatic security guarantee. However, it is not. Compared, say, with Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty of the WEU, it is merely an agreement to consult in the event of an attack on a NATO member. In any case, what constitutes an attack in the modern age? Cyberwarfare?

Implications for NATO's Nuclear Policy: The Credible Deterrent Dilemma

During the Cold War the assumption (and it was thankfully only an untested assumption) was that Article V linked the U.S. nuclear arsenal to the territorial defense of Western Europe. Enlargement definitively breaks that link and denuclearizes the Alliance. There is no conceivable scenario in which NATO would use nuclear weapons in defense of Central and Eastern European members. Consequently, NATO enlargement further decouples the United States from its allies (it would be ironic if Lithuania achieved by default what Russia had been working so hard for over the past fifty years). Therefore, the NATO nuclear security guarantee is, by and large, a bluff. Actually, it was always thus, at least since the mid-1960s when the Soviets gained effective nuclear parity with the United States. What the candidate countries have to consider is whether a contemporary conventional "bluff" is worth having. Clearly, for the majority of them it is. Indeed, its very uncertainty and ambiguity lends it some deterrent value. However, any deterrent needs credible military capability and overt political will to reinforce its credibility. This is the central paradox of NATO enlargement because it adds responsibilities without adding capabilities. It is the *sense* of security and stability that Alliance membership affords candidate countries that seems to matter, rather than the reality.

Implications for Public Opinion: The Who Pays What Dilemma

The past decade has witnessed a new phenomenon in the shaping of security and defense policy: the direct and potent influence of public opinion. All Western governments are increasingly sensitive to public concerns about the cost of security, be it in human or financial terms. Unfortunately, the celebrations were just a little too long and too loud at the end of the Cold War, and convinced their respective publics that the days of extensive security commitments were over. As a result, Europe has one almighty security hangover and it is questionable whether Western Europeans and Americans are prepared to spend large

amounts of money on extending either military or economic security to Central and Eastern European countries. Certainly, what passes for debate is hardly matched by enthusiasm. Indeed, much of the debate on this issue has been a quintessential exercise in transatlantic "buck-passing," primarily because public opinion in the West is otherwise engaged. Therefore, public opinion will have to be managed by governments more effectively than has hitherto been the case and that could have significant implications for NATO enlargement.

NATO enlargement will certainly have to be done on the cheap, if it is done at all. There are too many other competing interests in search of state funding for significant amounts to be invested on enlarging the Alliance. This is a problem that is exacerbated for many of the European allies by the strict budget constraints required by membership of the Eurozone. Unfortunately, today's politics are those of the immediate and sophisticated arguments about investing in the future of Europe that rarely get heard above the clamor for new hospitals and schools, or a further cut in income tax. This leaves two options. First, NATO enlarges within the framework of the existing bureaucracy. Second, the new members have to fund, more or less, the requisite reforms themselves.

There is another constituency that Americans and Western European all too readily forget: public opinion in the candidate countries. For many the promise of enlargement, be it that of NATO or the EU seems little like an Eastern Promise—always just over the horizon. The implications of dashed hopes and broken promises are replete with risks to stability. When does a delayed promise become a broken one? When is a broken promise an act of betrayal? These are very real issues for countries whose own histories have been consistently brutalized by a tragic combination of Great Power aggression and/or indifference. In such an environment security policy could be increasingly renationalized and in a region of weak and failing states this would be dangerous not just for the candidates themselves, but for all the NATO allies. Failure to export security to the East will only result in the East exporting problems to the West. Indeed, this is the reality that the West must confront. Crime, illegal migration and the destabilizing effects of poverty are ever more apparent on the streets of Western Europe.

Functional Implications of NATO Enlargement: The Who Does What Dilemma

There is a dangerous gulf opening between the United States and its allies about the purpose of the Alliance. This gulf is primarily the result

of contending military-technical choices that the United States and its allies are making. Indeed, there is a military-technical dichotomy in the Alliance today. The United States, for all its military might, seems able only to escalate from the top end of the Petersberg Tasks/small-scale contingency threshold. The Europeans, on the other hand, seem able only to escalate from the bottom end of the Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue missions) to some point up that limited scale (peacekeeping and some forms of peacemaking). Thus, the fundamental premise upon which the Alliance is founded, the sharing of both risks and burdens, is being undermined.

Many Americans reading this will no doubt jump at this statement and assert (once again) that the problems result from low European defense spending and a lack of willingness to follow the American lead. They are wrong. Indeed, the problem is primarily American in its making and, sadly, will only be made worse by NATO enlargement. For a whole range of domestic reasons (such as the power of defense-industrial lobby groups) the United States is preparing for a war that is not going to happen. It is being seduced into a military-technical "paradise" that is largely irrelevant for today's security needs. Consequently, the unwillingness of Americans to commit their forces to the kind of "muddy boots" peacekeeping that represents 90 percent of the security "market" effectively negates American leadership within the Alliance. It also forces the allies into a corner. They will never close the military-technical gap with the United States. Frankly, they do not need to because they face threats/risks different from those facing the United States. At the same time, peacekeeping is not merely a subset of war fighting. It is a very complex set of skills at which several European states excel and at which the United States is poor. In effect, the U.S. drive toward the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) forces Europeans to make a choice between war fighting and peacekeeping—a choice most do not want to make. Therefore, in order to demonstrate that they are able to perform at least some relevant missions, European states will increasingly opt to spend their limited funds on peacekeeping capabilities at the expense of war fighting. For the new members and candidate countries this problem is magnified. Indeed, such is the parlous state of their finances that they have no alternative but to follow the lead of their Western European counterparts in opting for cheaper, less capable, but more relevant peacekeeping. Consequently, it is difficult to envisage how in five years time Force XXI could possibly "interoperate" with, say, a Hungarian infantry battalion unless technology is diverted from its current course as a force separator and turned into a force bridge.

This military-technical schism, more than any other development, carries with it the potential to tear NATO apart. Moreover, in an atmosphere where it is British, French, Italian and German troops doing the dirty work and who are taking the casualties (East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone) European public opinion will simply not countenance American whining about burden sharing. Indeed, in such an environment European public opinion might decide that the EU is a better option for its security and defense than NATO. The burden-sharing debate is not a one-way street and the United States had better start getting its peacekeeping act together.

Implications for the United States: The Leadership/Partnership Dilemma

Finally, what are the implications for the United States? To many Europeans such is American power today that the United States no longer really constructs foreign policy in the classical sense; it simply exports domestic policy. Nowhere is this more apparent than over the protracted issue of NATO enlargement.[10] And yet it is not that simple. In a speech at NATO's Atlantic Fleet headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia on February 13, 2001 President Bush focused on both the enduring and changing qualities of the Alliance: "The security and welfare of each member of this [transatlantic] community depend upon the security and welfare of all. None of us alone can achieve economic prosperity or military security. None of us alone can assure the continuance of freedom. This is still true today. Our challenges have changed, and NATO is changing and growing to meet them. But the purpose of NATO remains permanent... together, united, we can deter the designs of aggression, and spare the continent from the effects of ethnic hatreds." In those sentences the president summed up America's dilemma: how to lead a process in an environment where leadership is not possible. In spite of its awesome power the United States no longer leads NATO. Indeed, at a time of unrivalled power it confronts allies who, themselves, have rediscovered their political authority. Hitherto, Americans were used to driving the agenda inside the Alliance in a way that would today be unthinkable.

In the run-up to the presidential elections the U.S. debate over NATO enlargement subsided, although this is likely to prove only a temporary respite and will undoubtedly increase in the run-up to the NATO Review Conference in 2002. Indeed, with such a delicate political balance existing between the Bush administration and Congress in the run-up to the 2002 mid-term elections, it is one of the foreign

policy issues that could well get mired in what is likely to prove an acerbic battle. The Clinton administration took the view that, having reached a binding agreement with the Europeans at the Madrid summit in 1997, the process of enlargement was a done deal and it was now simply a question of who and when, not if. That is no longer the case. Moreover, it was a bipartisan position held by both Democrats and Republicans, not least because of the vocal constituencies in the United States that trace their roots back to the candidate countries. It is Congress, therefore, that is again likely to take the political lead if, as seems possible, the administration fails to push the Europeans with sufficient vigor toward an acceptance of both a U.S. timetable and meeting much of the cost.

Of course, underpinning these tensions are two sharply contrasting views of burden sharing. Indeed, enlargement has become a metaphor for burden sharing in the American political mind mainly because of the refusal of Congress to fund the process. This sense of injustice is fuelled by the prevailing sense in Congress that the United States was doing Europe a favor through its presence during the Cold War. This is not only plain wrong, but it is likely to do irreparable damage if the United States does not back away from it. Moreover, Europeans will increasingly demand a redefinition of burden sharing to take into account their extensive aid programs (alongside which the U.S. effort pales) and their willingness to put troops in harms way during dangerous Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in a way that the United States seems unwilling to countenance. Europeans are also suspicious that for some in the United States (both Republicans and Democrats) NATO enlargement is simply a way for America to further disengage from European security.

For many Europeans NATO enlargement is indicative of the lack of clear thinking in a United States that encourages Europe to pay more and do more without wishing to concede any real concomitant increase in its political influence. Two things are clear. First, the United States is in Europe in pursuit of its own interests. It was always thus. Second, the United States is not going to leave Europe. The sooner the debate moves beyond the implied threat of disengagement that informs a lot of American rhetoric the sooner the political problems that afflict the alliance can be tackled.

Eastern Promise? The Implications of NATO Enlargement

So, what is to be done? Throughout this piece the complexities and paradoxes of NATO enlargement have dominated. Indeed, NATO

enlargement was a metaphor for the wider transatlantic relationship and, as such, has been trapped in a vicious circle of political posturing and maneuvering that is undermining the Alliance. This is a shame because a modern NATO remains a cornerstone of security relations, not just in the Euro-Atlantic area, but beyond. These are not just political niceties but observable fact. However, NATO must also be politically relevant and this means that the allies need to focus. It was Madeleine Albright who gave the Alliance the 3Ds (no discrimination, no decoupling and no duplication). What NATO needs today are the 5Cs: credibility, cohesion, convergence, commitment and candor. A *credible* security policy that does away with a vestigial Cold War doctrine that is progressively undermining the deterrent value of the Alliance. Policy *cohesion* with the EU to ensure that the negative, but unavoidable, implications of asymmetric enlargements are kept to a minimum. Planned *convergence* of the enlargement policies of the two organizations so that candidate/accession countries trying to fulfill what are essentially competing membership requirements from NATO and the EU do not lose valuable and limited resources. Political *commitment* from existing NATO members to ease the legitimate security concerns of Partner and Candidate countries through the use not only of the enlargement "tool," but other confidence and security-building measures. A *candid* statement on both the likely timetable for enlargement and the reality of the security "product" that new members can expect from the Alliance.

To assist in this process, several measures should be adopted:

- *A Euro-Atlantic security guarantee*: NATO should commit itself to a new Euro-Atlantic Security Guarantee to recognize and resolve the military dimension of asymmetric memberships and back-door security guarantees. The guarantee would commit the U.S., Canada and the fifteen EU member states and partner countries to support each other in times of crisis.
- *The reworking of Article V*: in light of the Euro-Atlantic security guarantee, the wording of Article V should be reworked to reinforce its political credibility. Ironically, this would involve recognizing the conditional nature of the security guarantee, that is, it is only an agreement only to consult in the event of a challenge to the security of a partner.
- *Flexible interoperability*: NATO needs to recognize and formalize the four basic levels of military capability within the Alliance (it is not going to change) by creating a new doctrine entitled "Flexible Interoperability." This would enable NATO to reach a true interoperability nexus and assist new members by permitting them to aim at interoperability targets that include peacekeeping as a goal in itself. Full spectrum war fighting is not a serious option for candidate countries.
- *Breaking the nuclear link*: NATO enlargement breaks the link between the territorial defense of a member and the American nuclear arsenal. This should be recognized in a protocol to the Treaty of Washington. It is inconceivable that the United States would go to nuclear war over, say, Lithuania and yet, in spite of all the doctrinal adjustments of the past decade, this remains implicit in the core mission of the Alliance. It is frankly ridiculous and undermines the wider credibility of the Alliance as a security and defense mechanism.
- *Denuclearizing the NATO–Russian relationship*: NATO's claim that it no longer considers Russia as an adversary is undermined by the presence of nuclear doctrine at the heart of the Alliance. Breaking the nuclear link would not only serve to reinforce the NATO–Russian Founding Act with little or no cost to the "reality" of Alliance capability, but help Russia accept progressive enlargement of NATO.
- *New Euro-Atlantic nuclear command*: a new autonomous nuclear command should be created by the United States, the United Kingdom and France that preserves a Western nuclear identity and the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent of last resort.
- *NATO–EU membership coordination*: European security is as much a function of economic security as military security. NATO and EU enlargements must be coordinated where possible by including the force improvements necessary for NATO membership as part of the overall economic package required to prepare European countries for accession to the EU. At present, NATO and EU enlargements effectively compete for scare resources.
- *Joint membership criteria*: in addition, membership performance criteria should be created that link improvements in economic capability required by the EU with the achievement of NATO standards. This would assist in the "sequencing" of economic and military development.
- *Joint membership funding*: funding for NATO candidate and EU accession states should be linked to their performance under the joint membership criteria.

- *New Euro-Atlantic security contract*: The United States and its allies have certain rights and obligations implicit in the contemporary relationship that need to be made explicit. These include recognition that: (1) burden sharing cannot be defined only by expenditure on high spectrum war-fighting capability; peacekeeping efforts and "security investments," such as aid, must also be factored into the equation (this will require a mind-set change in Washington); (2) recognition by the Europeans that the United States has the right to expect from its allies constructive support in extra-European security management without carte blanche agreement; to underpin this commitment the Europeans should create a register of forces (like the mechanism that governs forces answerable to the ARRC and ERRC) that are constantly in a high state of readiness and able to support U.S. forces in extra-European, out-of-area operations; and (3) in what is an extraordinarily fluid security environment in which any number of coalitions could confront any number of challenges, the West needs a new force and operational planning nexus that can work up possible coalition formats (both through virtual and real-time exercising) for operations worldwide.

Ultimately, true European security (and that is the end state of NATO enlargement) will only be achieved through a security settlement to which all agree and from which all benefit, including Russia. For the time being, however, the need for NATO to remain a European military security agency is compelling. This reinforces the need for a balanced approach to enlargement that matches expansion of members with improvements in capabilities, which militates against the "big-bang" approach to enlargement favored by some in the United States. NATO, therefore, is in the insurance business, offering different policies to different members. And, of course, like all insurance companies, hoping that disaster does not strike each and every member at one and the same time.

Notes

1. NATO, *The NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999), p. 83.
2. Gebhardt Von Moltke, "NATO Moves Towards Enlargement," *NATO Review* (January 1996), p. 6.
3. "Arrangements Concerning Non-EU European NATO Members and Other Countries which are Candidates for Accession to the EU," from "The Presidency Report on the European Security and Defense Policy," December 4, 2000, p. 22.

4. Speech by U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair to the Polish Stock Exchange, October 6, 2000, at www.number-10.gov.uk.
5. This is effectively what happened to Norway, Spain and Portugal in the year prior to their accession. They were treated as full members for all aspects of foreign policy coordination under the EPC formula. Norway then withdrew following a referendum that rejected EU membership.
6. "The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Russian Federation" (Brussels: NATO Office of Press and Information, 1997), p. 2.
7. Yuriy Davydov, "Russian Security and East-Central Europe," in V. Baranovsky, ed., *Russia and Europe—The Emerging Security Agenda* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1997), pp. 382–383.
8. "NATO's Open Door," in *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999), p. 82.
9. Radu Bogdan, "Romanian Reflections," in *NATO Review* (Spring/Summer 2000), p. 25.
10. "Remarks by the President to the Troops and Personnel," February 13, 2001, at www.whitehouse.gov.